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This research attempts to explain the poor performance of the Colombian economy in the 
world markets during the late nineteenth century.  Based on data on exportable production 
at the municipal level in 1892, coffee production in 1925 and of public land allocation and 
land conflicts during the nineteenth and twentieth century, we found that the greatest 
obstacle that faced Colombian export development was the weakness of settlers’ property 
rights in the frontier lands.  The quantitative results show that in the absence of land 
conflicts, the municipality’s exportable production would have been at least twice as much 
as that observed.  
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Esta investigación intenta explicar el pobre desempeño de la economía colombiana en los 
mercados mundiales a finales del siglo XIX. Basándose en datos de  producción exportable 
a nivel municipal en 1892, de producción de café en 1925, de adjudicación de tierras 
baldías y de conflictos de tierras durante el siglo XIX y el siglo XX, se encontró que el 
mayor obstáculo que enfrentó el desarrollo exportador colombiano fue la debilidad de los 
derechos de propiedad de los colonos en las tierras de frontera. Los resultados cuantitativos 
muestran que en ausencia de conflictos de tierras, la producción exportable a nivel 
municipal habría sido por lo menos dos veces más alta de la observada.  
 
Palabras Claves: Derechos de propiedad, Economía Exportadora, Conflictos de Tierra, 
Titulación, Expansión de la Frontera, Baldíos, Colombia.  
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Introduction 
 
The export performance of Colombia during the wave of globalization at the end of the 
nineteenth century was extremely poor. Per capita exports reached only US $6.0 the second 
worst performance after Haiti and barely one tenth of those of Argentina or Brazil.  This 
article states that the Colombian economy’s weak integration into the world markets at the 
end of the nineteenth century was ultimately the result of the weakness of settlers’ formal 
property rights in the frontier lands.  In fact, although the national legislation on public land 
allocation adapted to the boom of world demand for primary products, facilitating land 
titling and protecting the peasant settlers from large landowners´ encroachments, the de 
facto power of the latter and the high transaction costs of the land titling,  led to very few 
peasant settlers acquiring formal property titles.   
 
The lack of formal property rights on the frontier together with opportunities of higher 
revenue from exports of primary goods caused the emergence of land conflicts
7 at the end 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. We will show that the 
economic result of property rights disputes between peasant settlers and landowners was a 
level of exportable production much lower than its potential.  
 
This article is divided into eight sections.  The first sketches the structure of the Colombian 
economy after 1820 following Independence; the second presents the evolution of public 
lands (“baldíos”) granting and their legislation and how this is related to agrarian conflicts; 
the third presents the relationship between export agriculture and public lands, the fourth  
develops the conceptual framework of the relationship between property rights and land 
                                                 
7 The conflicts are defined as the peasant settlers’ petitions to national authorities to restore their lands 
invaded or encroached by landowners.      4
conflicts.  The fifth, sixth and seventh sections contain the descriptive statistics, the 
econometric model estimations and their results.  Section eight concludes.  
 
The Colombian economy during the nineteenth century  
 
The post Independence Colombian economy was deeply rooted in its colonial past 
(Ocampo, 1990) and inherited most of its features. The tax, the foreign and domestic trade 
and the labor force structures in the nineteenth century were quite similar to those of the 
Borbonic period. Nearly 80% of exports were comprised by precious metals whose 
revenues were used to import mainly consumption goods that once taxed provided most 
Government’s income. Thus, public finances were weak and depended mainly on customs 
that made up more than 50% of public revenue (Ocampo, 1990). As of labor only a small 
percentage of workers were free particularly those located in the urban centers. The rest 
worked in the Haciendas under non-wage arrangements as sharecroppers, tenants, peons or 
domestic laborers (Ocampo, 1990; Tovar, 1980).  
 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Colombian economy started to break its 
colonial structure. The liberal administrations (1850- 1880) implemented several reforms 
including abolition of slavery, disentailment of Church lands
8, legislation on public land 
settlements, elimination of colonial taxes on aguardiente and on tobacco as well as tithes 
and fifths (Diaz,  1977; Ocampo, 1990; Melo, 1989). In addition, Colombia became a 
federal Republic (the United States of Colombia) and free trade policy (librecambio) was 
adopted. The Conservative party gained the presidency in 1886 and remained in power 
until 1930. Under the Conservative rule the federal Republic was abolished and the country 
                                                 
8 Disentailment was the process through which church lands were expropriated in order to be  publicly 
auctioned.     5
turned back into centralism, the Catholic Church recovered their privileges while the trade 
policy became more protectionist. At the end of the nineteenth century Colombia 
underwent the One Thousand days War (1898-1902), a bloody civil conflict between 
liberals and conservatives. 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, foreign trade expanded and diversified. 
Precious metals reduce their importance in exports displaced by new products such as 
tobacco, coffee, quinine, indigo and leather (Melo, 1988).  Between 1850 and 1880 exports 
grew in average 4% per year prompting the expansion of other sectors namely river 
navigation and shipping, road construction and banking (Ocampo, 1990). Nevertheless, 
Colombia did not develop a stable export base insomuch as the exportable production –
quinine, tobacco, etc. - was short lived and just reacted to the world economic cycles.  
 
However, only coffee consolidated as a permanent export product and remained as the 
chief one until the end of the twentieth century. Thus, in 1860 coffee represented nearly 
8% of the country’s exports; in the early 1880s, 12%; at the end of the century, around 
50%; and by the middle of the 1920s, 79%
9.  The increase of coffee production triggered 
off the expansion of the agrarian frontier, which moved from the eastern regions of the 
country to the central and western areas.  Before 1885 coffee production in the latter 
regions was small but the late 1880s and 1890s rise of the international prices (more than 
50% between 1885 and 1896) spurred on its expansion. Coffee prices halved between 1896 
and 1900 (from US $15.8 to US $ 7.0 cents) ending the  boom in midst of the so-called 
Thousand Days War (1898–1902), which also disrupted harvests and exports
10. In 1902 
once the civil war was over, coffee production steadily increased until the crisis of 1929.  
                                                 
9 GRECO, El Crecimiento Colombiano en el Siglo XX. 
10 Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial, p. 114.   6
During that expansion the colonization of public lands in the Colombian west intensified – 
particularly lands suitable for coffee production (see Map 1 for the location of coffee 
production in 1851, 1892 and 1925).   
 
The second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century were 
characterized by a fast economic globalization, in which capital and labor flowed between 
countries and trade expanded (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999)
11. The economic impact of 
globalization and, in particular, export performance in each country depended, among 
others, on its factor endowment, natural resources, level of integration with world trade, 
domestic and foreign investment and country size.  Although exports in Latin America 
expanded at the same pace than world trade
12 there were important differences between 
countries.  In this region, Argentina, Chile and Brazil performed the best whereas Colombia 
was among the worst (see table 1).  
 
As seen in Table 1, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay experienced a fast export growth during 
1850–1912 while Colombia’s was below the Latin American average. As of per capita 
exports Chile, Uruguay and Argentina had the highest level while Colombia the lowest. 
Why Colombia had such low export development?  The traditional view states that external 
factors –namely world price cycles and low demand for Colombian products
13- were the 
main causes of the poor Colombia’s export development during the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  We will challenge that explanation and will maintain that internal 
factors, in particular, the weakness of land property rights may have been the hidden reason 
of Colombia’s meager integration to the world markets. 
                                                 
11 According to Madisson (1995), at 1990 prices, world exports rose from 7,300 million dollars in 1820 to 
56,200 million in 1870, 236,300 million in 1913 and 334,400 in 1929.  
12 Bulmer-Thomas (1994) The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, p. 56.  
13 These hypotheses were called “production-speculation” and “lottery of goods”, (Ocampo, 1984; Bulmer-
Thomas, 1994).    7
 
Land supply, property rights and land conflicts  
 
The population growth – from two millions to five millions between 1851 and 1913 – 
prompted the occupation of the vacant lands (baldios) in agrarian frontier areas.  After 
Independence in 1819 and more intensely after 1850, the national Government began 
granting public lands or baldíos, process that reached momentum during 1890-1930.   
Before the 1870s, property rights in these frontier lands were in general weakly defined as 
informal agreements established the boundaries of the settlers’ terrains. No need to go 
beyond since at the frontier land was abundant and economic opportunities from land were 
limited.  However, the expansion of world markets after 1870 offered new economic 
prospects to producers of primary goods in the periphery as land prices in the New World 
increased
14.  For instance in the Colombian, the notary data on land sales for the 
Department of Cundinamarca show that the price per fanegada (0.66 hectares) rose by more 
than 200% between the 1850s and the end of the century
15.  As land became scarce, 
informal property rights turned inadequate. Titling became a need for agrarian producers if 
they wanted to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the world markets.  
 
Peasant settlers faced a great deal of problems and obstacles to title their occupied terrains. 
On the one hand, titling was costly since it involved for instance hiring lawyers and 
surveyors, fencing, etc.; on the other hand, local landowners were powerful and used every 
tool in order to prevent land titling to peasants and rather obtaining it for them
16.   In many 
occasions landowners successfully claimed the terrains already occupied by peasants. 
                                                 
14 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History: An example of these new opportunities at the world 
level is the drastic increase in land prices in the different regions of the world.  O’Rourke and Williamson 
(1999) show that between 1870 and 1910 the price of land increased by 250% in the United States.   
15 Sánchez et al., Precios de la Tierra en Cundinamarca. 
16 LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina.   8
However, the latter continued occupying the lands in dispute, as they would not give up the 
vast economic possibilities of export economy.  Hence, conflicts and legal disputes over 
land between peasant settlers and landowners were just the result of the weakness and 
instability of formal property rights in the frontier in a context of expected higher land 
returns.  
 
According to LeGrand (1988), the legislation on public land allocation during the 
nineteenth century had two phases.  The first, from 1820 to 1873, had fiscal motivations, in 
particular to cover the expenses of the war of Independence
17.  The central government 
issued bonds that were exchanged for public lands.  This policy meant that most of the 
public lands were allocated to rich businessmen and landowners.  After 1873, land titling 
policy was redirected to bring it more in line with the economic changes set off by export 
economy.  Thus, law 61 of 1874 and law 48 of 1882 established that those settlers who 
occupied terrains for five years or more and made productive use of them would be 
awarded property titles
18.  The legislation limited as well the concentration and 
unproductive use of the land
19.  However, the high costs of the titling process impeded most 
of the settlers in the frontier lands to establish formal property rights
20.  In addition, to the 
low capacity of central government to enforce land laws at local level facilitated to 
                                                 
17 The expenses of independence included both internal and foreign debts and  payments to war veterans, 
their creditors or legitimate children, who were compensated with lands of approximately 10 hectares 
(Parsons, 1997). 
18 LeGrand (1988) mentions that the legislation protected the settlers, guaranteeing them the property rights 
of any baldíos they took over, thus preventing their expulsion from the lands that they occupied.  Articles 2, 
5 and 6 from law 48 of 1882 are examples of such legal protection.  Article 2 indicated that the land 
cultivators would be considered “good faith” owners and therefore could not be deprived of the property 
unless a sentence ruled otherwise.  Article 5 declared that should there be a case in which the cultivator lost 
the property through a ruling, he could not have the land he occupied taken from him until he was 
compensated with the value of the improvements he had made to the land.  Lastly, article 6 stipulated that the 
agents of the public Ministry must support the cultivators of baldíos in any case of land dispute against them.  
19 LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina; Parsons, La Colonización Antioqueña; Brew, El Desarrollo 
Económico en Antioquia.  Law 48 of 1882 established that the maximum allocation would be 5,000 hectares. 
In 1912 it was reduced to 2,500.  The law also determined that if the land remained unproductive for more 
than ten years, it would return to government’s hands (LeGrand, 1988). 
20 The transaction costs of titling included – among others – surveyors and lawyers’ fees, headed paper and, 
stamps charges and property registration (LeGrand, 1988).   9
landowners either the occupation of vacant public lands or the encroachment of those being 
exploited by settlers
21.  In an environment of growing economic opportunities for 
agricultural activities, the interaction between the settlers’ informal rights and the increase 
in the land returns and export prices led to land conflicts
22. 
 
Policies to liberalize land during the second half of the nineteenth century were 
implemented by the liberal party administrations as it was believed that the concentration 
and immobility of that factor curbed economic progress.  Granting or selling of public 
lands, disentailment (expropriation) of church goods and dissolution of indigenous 
territories (resguardos) were the chief policies implemented to increase the land available 
for economic exploitation. Thus, between 1850 and 1930 land policies brought about that 
nearly 6% of the inhabited Colombian territory ended up in private hands.  
 
Between 1850 and 1930 land granting experienced various cycles as shown in Graph 1. 
Before 1850 only around twenty square kilometers per year were titled, from 1850 to 1865  
such figure reached ninety  as the export economy began to flourish and during the 1870s 
with quinine and tobacco export boom land granting rose to nearly 4,000
23.  The 1880s 
reduction of titling was followed by a recovery that started in 1886 as a new cycle of export 
growth began reaching a 3,000 square kilometer peak in 1891-1895
24. Land titled had its 
lowest levels during 1901-1905, following the Thousand Days War.  As seen in Graph 1 
once the war ended, land titling increased achieving its highest levels during 1920-1925. 
Graph 1 also presents the number of public land grants, which not always followed a pattern 
                                                 
21 LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina. 
22 Alston et al.,“Violence and the development of property rights”, p. 152. 
23 Although exists data from 1827, the quantity of land granted between 1827 and 1850 was low, since the 
government did not encourage as much the colonization of frontier lands that through their sale were rather 
regarded as a source of fiscal revenue  (LeGrand, 1988). 
24 According to LeGrand (1988), with the extinction of the tobacco and quinine boom, the granting process 
slowed down until the beginning of the coffee boom. LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina, p. 72.   10
similar to the quantity of square kilometers titled.  Before 1900 the rise of the number of 
allotments (titling) coincided with the increase of land titled. In contrast, during 1900-1915 
as land allotments intensified quantity of land titled grew at lesser pace implying that the 
size of the lots assigned was much smaller.  
 
According to table 2 during 1853–1873, 61% (318) of the titling allotments comprised land 
granted to peasant settlers (a titulo de cultivador)
25 and 39% (206) public land sales to 
landowners. Nevertheless, one important difference between the two types of land 
allocation rested in the size of the terrains titled.  As table 2 shows, from 1853 to 1873, 77% 
of the area titled was acquired through bonds and 23% was granted for free to peasant 
settlers.  
During 1874 to 1892, when legislation was more favorable to squatters, 68% (413) of land 
allotments were granted to them and the remaining allotted through bonds to landowners.  
However, 69% (4,166.59 km
2) of the quantity of terrains consisted of sales, while 31% 
(1,913.19 km
2) grants to peasant settlers. Thus, the size of plots assigned through bonds was 
in average of 2,000 hectares while squatters’ plots reached in average 600 hectares. Hence, 
despite national government policies intended to favor and to attract those who would 
occupy small parcels, most of the land titled ended up in landowners hands. 
 
As LeGrand (1988) shows, the increase in the number of agrarian conflicts was the result of 
the usurpation by landowners of squatter occupied lands in the frontier. From 1827 to 1869, 
just one agrarian conflict was registered, 69 during 1870-1900, 137 between 1901 and 1917 
and 241 from 1918 to1931.  Two factors influenced the rise of the land conflicts after 1870, 
first of all higher demand for land titles by peasant settlers and secondly the landowners’ 
                                                 
25 Article 1 of law 48 of 1892 stipulated that who cultivated public lands for at least five years would get for 
free the right over the exploited land plus another neighboring terrain of equal size. 
   11
encroachments of the same terrains prompted by larger expected land returns.  According to 
the type of titling, 63% of the land conflicts occurred in municipalities where land was 
allotted through bonds, while 36% occurred where it was granted to peasant settlers
26.  This 
pattern suggests that during the nineteenth century landowners intended to expand their 
lands where they already had properties.  Thus, the agrarian conflicts arose as a 
consequence of a slow titling process of public lands occupied by peasant settlers in an 
environment of primary export opportunities.    
 
Export agriculture and public lands at the end of the nineteenth century  
 
During early 1890s, the country began to recover from the export crisis of the previous 
decade that led to the disappearance of quinine.  Increase in coffee prices, in production of 
precious metals and in tobacco exports marked the late 1880s economic recovery and the 
start of a new era of export development
27.  Table 3 shows the value of harvests for five 
exportable products (tobacco, coffee, cacao, sugar and plantain) in 1892
28. The data source 
is the 1892 census of exportable products carried out at municipal level. Coffee with 38.9% 
had the highest share in production followed by plantain with 25.3%, tobacco with 14.3%, 
and cacao with 14.1% and, lastly, sugar with 7.5%.  Although plantain was exported in very 
low quantities the census’ authorities included it among the exportable products. According 
to the census the 1892 total value of exportable production was 6,817.7 thousand pesos, of 
which 4,164.8 corresponds to products other than coffee
29.   
                                                 
26 Authors’ calculations based on data from Gaceta Oficial (1854, 1856, 1858–1861), Registro Oficial (1862–
1864), Diario Oficial (1865–1931) and LeGrand (1988). 
27 Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial, p. 113. 
28 Exportable products are understood to be all products that could potentially be exported.  
29 These figures are consistent with Ocampo’s (1984) estimates of exports excluding coffee and precious 
metals that reached 3,804.1 thousand pesos in 1891 and 3,409 in 1894.  For instance, 1892 tobacco production 
totaled 4.526 tons which is coherent with the 3.500 tons of exports that Ocampo (1984) estimates for 1891. 
Although the census and Ocampo’s (1984) calculations use different methodologies and sources, the basic   12
 
Table 4 presents for each department its percentage share of 1892 exportable production in 
pesos, of 1892 coffee production in pesos and of 1925 total number of coffee trees. Each 
departmental figure results after adding up production, in one case, across municipalities 
where public lands allotments occurred and, in other case, across neighboring 
municipalities of the former   (located at a maximum distance of 25 kilometers).   
 
Table 4 shows that 45% of 1892 exportable production took place in municipalities with 
public land allotments during 1827- 1892.  Such percentage reaches 82% if exportable 
crops of neighboring municipalities (located within 25 kilometers) are included.  Coffee 
production in 1892 and 1925 number of coffee trees has the same pattern.  Consequently 
table 4 reveals that exportable production established itself mainly in the frontier lands or, 
in other words, in places either that experienced public land titling or near to them.  The 
significance of the agrarian frontier for the export development is also evident if analysis is 
done by departments.   
 
Thus, 100% of 1982 export production grew in departments as Córdoba, Huila, Norte de 
Santander, Quindío and Risaralda in municipalities with allotments of public lands or in 
their neighboring areas. In Cundinamarca, Tolima, Bolívar and Caldas approximately 92% 
of their export crops located on the frontier. Moreover, 100% of the coffee production in 
Quindío, Risaralda and Córdoba and 92% of Huila’s was harvested in frontier lands. In 
1925, when coffee was already consolidated as the chief export product, between 80% and 
100% of the grain was picked in the frontier lands of Cesar, Magdalena, Huila, Risaralda 
and Valle del Cauca,  Quindío and La Guajira.  
                                                                                                                                                  
principle that production cannot be lower than exports (in the absence of re-exports) is validated. See Ocampo, 
Colombia y la Economía Mundial, pp. 106–107.   13
 
Land conflicts and the export economy: a theoretical framework 
 
As world demand for primary goods augmented so did exportable production in frontier. 
Growing international demand drove up expected returns and market prices of local lands.  
In a milieu of informal property rights, squatters got incentives to title their terrains and 
landowners were incited to encroaching them. Thus, titling demand from peasant settlers 
increased as well as conflict or disputes over land. Graph 2 shows that greater dynamics of 
land titling coincided with rise in international export prices, while periods of lesser land 
titling activity matched lower international prices. 
 
However, despite the incentives for exportable production, it was limited by the lack of 
formal property rights of peasant settlers and by the conflict and disputes over squatters’ 
terrains.  Two factors impeded a wide spreading of formal property rights among squatters: 
the high cost of titling and the central government’s low capacity to enforce land laws at a 
local level that facilitated landowners’ to appropriate for themselves encroached lands. 
Hence, it is argued that the mentioned aspects contributed quite negatively to Colombia’s 
performance in the world markets at the end of the nineteenth century and even to long-
term export performance in the twentieth century.  
 
Graph 3 formalizes the relationship between property rights and land conflict for a 
Colombian frontier municipality.  Panel A shows the market of formal property titles for the 
peasant settlers whose demand depends negatively on the titling costs.  The demand curve 
takes the value of one when it cuts axis x (percentage of formal titles). At this point the 
entire frontier land will be titled as titling costs are equal to zero.  The supply curve reflects   14
the government’s capacity to offer titles and depends positively on the titling costs. It is 
assumed that as titling costs rise the government will increasing titling activity (more 
bureaucracy opening of new offices, etc.) and thus encouraging settlers to get formal 
property rights.  The equilibrium at panel A determines the percentage of settlers’ lands 
with formal property titles.   
  
Panel C contains the “market of land conflicts”.  The supply of conflicts, i.e land 
encroachments by local landowners will grow as their power relatively to the central 
government’s increases.  The demand for land conflicts by central government authorities 
will depend on its capacity to enforce national land laws at local level and protect peasant 
settlers from encroachments. In other words, it depends as well on landowner relative 
power
30.  Thus, the quantity of land conflicts at the local level will be determined by the 
relative strength of the de facto institutions -power of the landowners- relative to the de 
jure  institutions  ability of the central government to enforce the law or institutional order 
at local level. The equilibrium of the "market of land conflicts" is established at point c1. 
For instance, if the supply curve of land conflicts cuts the demand curve at point K on the 
axis x, the power landowner would be low and zero the quantity of land conflicts.  
 
The simultaneous equilibrium of the markets of titles and conflicts is shown in Panel B, 
where the relationship between the percentage of land titled and the number of conflicts is 
set up. As occurred before 1870, if the expected land returns are relatively low, the 
equilibrium would involve low levels of conflict and titling (point b1 in the panel B). Now, 
if market opportunities improve – as happened after 1870 because of the boom in world 
markets – demand curve for land titling shifts to point a2, as depicted in Panel A. Such 
                                                 
30 For the Colombian case, LeGrand (1988) maintains that the national power was very weak in relation to 
the local power, meaning the landowners had incentives to encroach on and manipulate the acquisition of 
lands. LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina, p. 80.   15
shift would indicate greater colonization of public lands and more titling activity at higher 
costs.    
In panel C, the supply curve of land conflicts shift to the right to c2 as a result of the higher 
expected profits from agricultural activities that encourage landowners to encroach peasant 
terrains.  The movements of the demand curve for titles in Panel A and of the supply curve 
of conflicts in Panel C shifts, in Panel B, the locus “conflict – percentage of titling” to the 
new point of equilibrium b2.  Thus, the new equilibrium b2 reflects larger amounts of both 




Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and some independent variables 
of the model to be estimated.  Column 1 shows the variable mean by municipalities; 
column 2, the standard deviation and columns 3 and 4, their minimum and maximum 
values.  The first three dependent variables are the logarithms of the municipal per capita 
production (in pesos of 1892) of the exportable products (total exportable, exportable 
without plantain, only coffee).  The last dependent variable, coffee in 1925, is the 
logarithm of the number of per capita municipal coffee trees.    
 
For the purposes of the econometric estimation, it was assumed that the three types of land 
supply expansion (colonization of public lands, disentailment or expropriation of church 
lands and dissolution of indigenous lands - resguardos) not only influenced exportable 
production in the municipality where they took place, but also in the neighboring ones, 
though in a decreasing fashion.  In order to observe such spatial effect, we calculated the 
variables: “distance to public lands, 1850–1892”, “distance to disentailments” and   16
“distance to dissolution of resguardos”.  These variables take the value of 1 in a 
municipality where their existence is reported and 0 if the municipality is located more 
than 100 km away from any municipality that had the above-mentioned institutions.  If the 
municipality does not report any of the referred types of land expansion and is located 
within the range of the 100 km, a value between 0 and 1 is assigned, depending on its 
distance to the nearest municipality that reports it. 
 
Thus, on average, the distance to municipalities with Church lands Disentailment was 0.58 
(of a maximum of 1); with public lands allotments 0.61 and with dissolution of indigenous 
lands (resguardos) 0.29.  The variable “distance to colonial institutions”, based on Tovar’s 
figures (1988) and calculated by Duque and Sánchez (2007) – following the methodology 
of Naritomi et al. (2007) – is the average of the distances from the nearest one that had 
Encomiendas in 1560 and more than 20 slaves in 1800 to a municipality that did not have 
those institutions. That variable will be used in the econometric estimations as an 
instrumental variable of the land conflict According to Table 5, the distance to 
municipalities with Encomienda was 0.75 (of a maximum of 1); with slavery (more than 
20 slaves in 1800) was 0.29, with public lands allotments 0.61 and with dissolution of 
indigenous lands (resguardos) 0.29.Table 5 also shows that 15% of the municipalities 
reported land conflicts during 1850–1917 and 21% during 1827–1931.  
 
Empirical model 
The econometric strategy seeks to relate the relative strength of the property rights 
expressed in the existence of land conflicts with the exportable production at municipal 
level.  For this, the following model is estimated:   
, 0 1 2 3 1851 4 sup Pr
i j ii i i i i Y Geography Land ply oduction LandConflictoj ββ β β β ε =+ + + + +    17
where Yji is the production of exportable products in the municipality i for the year j (where 
j is 1892 or 1925).  For 1892, the exportable production included tobacco, coffee, sugar, 
cacao and plantain; Geographyi is a matrix with the variables of altitude, soil fertility, 
precipitation, rivers in kilometers, temperature, humidity, the distances of each 
municipality to the main cities and the distance to Cauca river; Landsupplyi is a matrix 
with the variables of dissolution of Resguardos, church land disentailments and public land 
titling.  The variables take the value of 1 in a municipality that reports having them, and a 
value of between 0 and 1 that depends on the distance to the nearest municipality that had 
them.  Production1851i  is a matrix with dummy variables for the production of sugar, 
tobacco, cacao, plantain and coffee in municipality i in 1851; LandConflicti takes a value 
of 1 if any land conflicts occurred between 1827 and 1917 and 0 if not
31.  
 
Nevertheless, as conflict arises due to the interaction of higher expected land returns (new 
international markets for exportable goods) and the existence of informal property rights, 
the variable Landconflict may be endogenous to the exportable production activity.  Thus, 
it is needed the use of instrumental variables in order to avoid the possible bias of the 
estimators.  The instrument used was “distance to colonial institutions”. We use this 
variable under the assumption that the nineteenth century power of the central government 
was stronger in those places where these institutions existed and that this strength 
diminishes with the distance.  In order to construct the variable “distance to colonial 
institutions”, we determined the localization of both the Encomiendas in 1560 and the 
places with more than 20 slaves in 1800
32.  Closeness to colonial institutions is an average 
                                                 
31 As observed, the time span for land conflict goes beyond 1892 the year of production census. That is the 
case because if the existence of a land conflict reflected the weakness of the formal property rights, this 
weakness should have emerged 20 or 30 years before the settlers began the legal process of land restitution. 
Such process may have started for instance in 1910 but the dispute between the peasant settler and the 
landowner as early as 1880 or before.  
32 Tovar, Grandes Empresas Agrícolas y Ganaderas; Tovar et al., Convocatoria al Poder del Número.    18
of the distance from the closest municipalities with Encomienda and the existence of more 
than 20 slaves. It takes the value of 1 in municipalities that had the presence of both 
institutions and 0 at more than 100 km distance of a municipality with any of these 
institutions.   
 
A value between 0 and 1 was assigned to each municipality where there was no 
Encomienda or there were less than 20 slaves, but it was located at less than 100 km 
distance of the nearest municipality with any of these variables. The value was determined 
by the average of the closest distance of the municipality without Encomienda to one with 
Encomienda and of the municipality with less than 20 slaves to one with more than 20 
slaves.  This means that these new variables should be able to explain the existence of land 
conflicts and at the same time should not determine the exportable production in 1892.   
 
Thus, the equation for land conflicts takes the following form:   
 











where ClosenessColonialInstitutionsi is the central government’s influence in a determined 
municipality
33. In the municipalities where these institutions existed, the central 
government authority at the end of the nineteenth century was stronger and it could better 
enforce the land laws and property rights at the local level than in those where such 
authority was weak or did not exist at all.  Historically the Spaniards settled in places 
where indigenous labor force was abundant and in these locations the formal land property 
                                                 
33 Based on the visits of 1560 transcribed by Tovar (1988), it can be said that the Spaniards began to found 
“villages of Indians” in the places that had indigenous populations, as they needed to use them as a 
workforce.  Similarly, the slave population was used to work in economic activities, such as gold extraction, 
domestic work in some urban centres or on the sugar or cotton plantations (Colmenares, 1999).  In this way, 
the existence of tributary Indians and of slaves reveals the presence of the State and of the Spanish colonial 
institutions.     19
rights established were a concession of the Spanish Crown
34. Thus, the regions with 
colonial institutions would have less conflicts either over the land already titled or to be 
titled. In addition, in these regions the Crown enforced the law through its bureaucracy and 
institutions creating a tradition of compliance that must have persisted after Independence.  
 
  As the central government was more resilient, it discouraged the encroachment onto 
peasant settlers’ lands by landowners, reducing the existence of conflicts.  As there is no 
ground to expect that the existence of the Encomienda or of slaves during colonial times 
explain export performance in 1892 or in 1925, these variables are suitable instruments.  In 
fact, the exogeneity test for the variable ClosenessColonialInstitutions indicates that its 
correlation with production of exportable products is not different from zero. 
 
Empirical Results  
 
Table 6 shows the results estimated with instrumental variables. We use a probit model to 
determine the probability of presence of exportable production and a tobit model to 
measure the level of exportable production.  Columns 1 and 6 show the econometric results 
for per capita total exportable production (coffee, tobacco, plantain, sugar and cacao) 
measured in pesos; columns 2 and 7 exclude plantain from the export production; columns 
3 and 8 include only coffee; and columns 4, 5, 9 and 10 include the per capita production 
of coffee in 1925 (measured in number of trees).  
 
Table 6 also contains the first stage estimations, showing the relation between the conflicts 
(1827–1917) and the instrumental variable.  For all probit estimations, “distance from 
                                                 
34 Colmenares, 1999.    20
colonial institutions” is negative and significant at 99%, suggesting that municipalities with 
or close to colonial institutions in the past experienced a lower probability of land conflicts 
at the end of the nineteenth century. In those municipalities, the central government could 
more strongly enforce the land laws and deter landowners’ encroachments. The Wald test 
statistics allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-exogeneity, confirming the need 
to using instrumental variables.   
 
The same table exhibits the results for exportable production (second stage).  In both 
models, for the different production variables (total, without plantain, only coffee 1892 and 
only coffee 1925), land conflicts have a negative and significant impact on the presence 
and on the per capita exportable production.  Thus, in those municipalities where there 
were land conflicts, the probability of these municipalities producing exports production in 
1892 is reduced by 53%
35.  Thus, land conflicts had a negative effect on the export 
development, confirming that the weakness of property rights contributed to the poor 
performance of the export economy and hence to the meager integration of Colombia in 
the international markets at the end of the nineteenth century.    
 
As for the effects of other variables, the allocation of public land in a municipality also has 
a positive effect – significant at 99% – on the existence of export development, indicating 
that the allotment of public lands in a municipality increased in 40% the probability of 
producing exportable goods in 1892.  Alternatively, the existence of disentailed Church 
assest increased that probability by 14%.  Similar results are obtained if plantain is taken 
out of production or if production is reduced only to coffee in 1892 (see Table 6). 
 
                                                 
35 This reduction is respectively 53% and 43% when plantain is excluded and only coffee in 1892 is included.     21
Using tobit estimation, we find that land conflict has a negative and significant coefficient 
for the four production variables (total, without plantain, only coffee 1892 and only coffee 
1925).  We confirm then that in the municipalities with agrarian conflicts, exportable 
production was lower than its potential.  This result indicates that, in 1892 in absence of 
land conflicts per capita exportable production would have been at least twice as much as 
the observed actual production.  Thus, the average per capita exportable output in 1892 
was 1.49 pesos (=exp(0.4) of Table 5), whereas in the absence of land conflicts it would 
have been 3.73 pesos (exp(0.4-(0.15*(-6.12))).  In the case of coffee production, it would 
have been 3.17 pesos rather than 1.19 pesos. By doing the same calculation for coffee trees 
in 1925, we observe that the average number of coffee trees – taken as a proxy of coffee 
production- was 7.02, while in the absence of conflicts, this would have been 21.2.  If 
taken into account for a greater conflict period (1827–1931), this calculation rises to 35.5 
coffee trees. 
   
Regarding the land variables, the influences of disentailment activity and of public land 
titling (that take a value between 1 and 0 as explained above) in the municipality are 
related positively with all four exportable products (total, without plantain, only coffee 
1892 and only coffee 1925).  In contrast, the dissolution of resguardos in the eighteenth 
century has a negative effect although the coefficients are significant only for coffee in 
1892 and in 1925.  
 
In summary, the econometric results confirm the hypothesis that the poor integration of the 
Colombian economy into the world market at the end of the nineteenth century was the 
result of the weakness of property rights in agrarian frontier that prompted an important 
number of land conflicts.  The peasant settlers’ lack of land titles fed their fear of   22
encroachment, which may have inhibited them from sowing or increasing productivity to 
their highest potential.  The limited transformation of informal property rights into formal 
ones, more in line with the economic opportunities of globalization, was one of the factors 
that heavily contributed to delay export development.  The consequences of the land 
conflicts persisted even in the 1925 coffee production.  Thus, property rights institutions 





This article shows the relationship between the expansion of the agrarian frontier, land 
conflicts and the production of exportable goods at the end of the nineteenth century.  It 
starts out the hypothesis that land conflicts were the result of the combination of economic 
opportunities offered by globalization and the lack of formal property rights on the frontier.  
As landowners had incentives to encroach on those lands that had been occupied by peasant 
settlers the latter restrained themselves from sowing or investing, which may have 
determined that the production of exportable products were below its potential.   
 
Our econometric evidence indicates that the land conflict had a negative effect on the 
potential production of exportable goods.  In fact, it is estimated that, in the absence of land 
conflict, exportable production in 1892 could have been twice as much as the observed one 
and more than three times in the case of the number of coffee trees in 1925.  To correct the 
likely endogeneity of the “land conflicts” variable, the average distance – standardized from 
0 to 1 – between a municipality with no colonial institutions and the nearest one that had 
colonial institutions (Encomienda in 1560 or more than 20 slaves in 1800) was used as the 
                                                 
36 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) contrast the effect of the contracting institutions with the property rights 
institutions and they find that the latter are those that affect the most countries’ long-term economic 
performance, whether it be measured by income per capita or by the rate of investment.     23
instrument.  The results also show that there was a positive relationship between the 
production of export goods and the public land allotments.   
 
This article concludes that internal factors, more so than external factors, informal structure 
of property rights on the frontier areas and central government’s incapacity to restrict the 
encroaching behavior of the landowners at the local level, curbed the Colombian export 
development during the nineteenth century.   
Appendix 1 
Variable Definition  Source 
Production of exportable 
products per capita (Log 
1892) 
Logarithm of the value of the production of exportable products that includes 
coffee, cacao, sugar, plantain and tobacco in 1892 prices.  
Boletín Trimestral de la 
Estadística Nacional 
(1894) 
Production of exportable 
products per capita 
without plantain (Log 
1892) 
Logarithm of the value of the production of exportable products that includes 
coffee, cacao, sugar and tobacco in 1892 prices. 
Boletín Trimestral de la 
Estadística Nacional 
(1894) 
Coffee production per 
capita (Log 1892)  Logarithm of the value of the coffee production in 1892 prices. 
Boletín Trimestral de la 
Estadística Nacional 
(1894) 
Coffee production per 
capita (Log 1925)  Logarithm of the quantity of coffee trees in existence in 1925.  Monsalve (1927) 
Distance from colonial 
institutions 
Calculated as the normalization of the average distance (between 0 and 1) of 
a municipality with respect to the nearest municipalities where there were 
encomiendas in 1560 and more than 20 slaves in 1800.  Takes a value of 1 in 
the municipalities where there were both institutions and 0 if there was neither 
institution in the municipalities at a maximum of 100 km distance.    
Tovar (1988) and Duque 
& Sánchez (2007) 
Distance from 
disentailments 
Calculated taking into account the distance between the municipality in 
question and the nearest municipality with disentailed church properties.  It 
takes a value of 1 when the municipality had disentailed properties and 0 if the 
nearest municipality with this institution was at more than 100 km distance.  
For those municipalities within the 100 km range, a value of between 0 and 1 
was calculated, depending on the distance to the nearest municipality that 
reported this institution.   
Archivo General de la 
Nación (AGN), Sección 
República, Fondo de 
Bienes Desamortizados 
(Rolls 1 to 30), Registro 
Oficial 1862–1864 and 
Diario Oficial 1865–1884   24
Distance from public 
lands 
Calculated taking into account the distance between the municipality in 
question and the nearest municipality with public land awards.  It takes a value 
of 1 when the municipality had public land awards, and 0 if the nearest 
municipality with this institution was at more than 100 km distance.  For those 
municipalities within the 100 km range, a value of between 0 and 1 was 
calculated, depending on the distance to the nearest municipality that reported 
this institution.   
Registro Oficial (1862–
1864) and Diario Oficial 
(1865–1931) 
Distance from dissolution 
of resguardos in 18th 
century 
Calculated taking into account the distance between the municipality in 
question and the nearest municipality with dissolution of resguardos in the 
eighteenth century.  It takes a value of 1 when the municipality had dissolution 
of protection in the eighteenth century, and 0 if the nearest municipality with 
this institution was at more than 100 km distance.  For those municipalities 
within the 100 km range, a value of between 0 and 1 was calculated, 
depending on the distance to the nearest municipality that reported this 
institution.   




It takes a value of 1 if the municipality had land conflict between 1827 and 
1917 and 0 if not.  LeGrand (1988) 
Dummy conflict 1827–
1931 
It takes a value of 1 if the municipality had land conflict between 1827 and 
1931 and 0 if not.  LeGrand (1988) 
Dummy production 1851 
Matrix of variables of the production of sugar, tobacco, cacao, plantain and 
coffee that takes a value of 1 if the product was produced in the municipality in 
1851 and 0 if not. 
Geografía Física y 
Política de la 
Confederación 
Granadina, volumes I, II, 
III, IV, V, directed by 
general Agustín Codazzi 
(2002) 
Geographical Variables 
Altitude  Metres above sea level.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Fertility 
Index reflecting the aptitude of the land for agricultural activities (drainage, 
erosion, natural slopes, sodium contents, etc.).  
Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Precipitation  Maximum rain levels per year.   Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Rivers 
Index of extension of primary, secondary and tertiary rivers that run through 
the area of a municipality. 
Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Temperature  Average degrees centigrade in the municipality.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Distance to River Cauca  Index of minimum distance of the municipality from the River Cauca.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Distance to Bogotá  Index of minimum distance of the municipality from Bogotá.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
Distance to Barranquilla  Index of minimum distance of the municipality from Barranquilla.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)   25
Distance to Cali  Index of minimum distance of the municipality from Cali.  Sánchez & Nuñez (2000) 
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a) Dollars per capita 
(b) Exports in millions of dollars.                                      










  Export growth (%)
Per capita exports 
1913 (a) 
Total exports 1913 
(b) 
Argentina 6.1  67  510.3 
Bolivia 2.5  20  36.5 
Brazil   3.7  13  315.7 
Chile   4.3  75  142.8 
Colombia   3.5  6  33.2 
Ecuador 3.5  12  15.8 
Paraguay 3.9  10  5.5 
Peru 2.9  9  43.6 
Uruguay 3.4  59  71.8 
Venezuela 2.7 9  28.3 
Latin America  3.9  24  1588.2   30
Table 2. Land allocation by type of titling, 1853–1930. 
   1853–1873 1874–1892 1893–1917 1918–1930  Total 
Titles allotted to landowners through 
bonds  206 192 324 120 842 
Titles allotted to peasant settlers 
through  free grants   318  413  1479  266  2,476 
Total number of titles allotted   524  605  1803  386  3,318 
Square kilometers 
  allotted to 
landowners    5,323.09 4,166.59 3,895.68 2,038.95  15,424.31 
 Square kilometers 
  allotted to  peasant 
settlers   1,627.13 1,913.19 4,409.72 3,497.17  11,447.21 
Total number of square kilometers 
allotted  6,950.22 6,079.78 8,305.40 5,536.12  26,871.52 
 Source: Gaceta Oficial (1854, 1856, 1858–1861), Registro Oficial (1862–1864), Diario Oficial (1865–1931) and authors’ calculations.  
 
Table 3. Value of exportable production in 1892 (in thousands of pesos and percentages) 
  
Thousands of 
pesos  % 
Tobacco 972.25  14.26 
Coffee 2,652.94  38.91 
Cacao 961.2  14.10 
Sugar 508.31  7.46 
Plantain 1,723.03  25.27 
Total 6,817.73  100 
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Table  4. Exportable production in municipalities with public lands allotments 
(percentages). 
  
Percentage of the 1892f total 
production  
Percentage of the1982  coffee 
production  
Percentage of the 1925l number 

















  Antioquia  13.66 48.29 20.89 65.93 19.91 60.34 
  Bolívar  20.53 70.27 10.75 63.21    -  100.00 
  Boyacá  12.86 74.23  3.57  50.72 26.65 63.23 
 Caldas  5.81  86.7   -  100.00  35.99  64.01 
 Casanare  -    -   -  -    -  6.42 
  Cauca  9.81  7.01  45.65 21.80 26.47 55.60 
 Cesar   -   -   -  -   83.63  16.37 
 Córdoba  100   -  100.00   -   -   - 
  Cundinamarca  49.83 42.51 57.36 34.81 22.70 46.02 
Guajira   -   -   -  -   100.00  -  
  Huila  68.94 31.06 91.79  8.21  84.43 15.57 
Magdalena   -   -  -    -  82.15   - 
 Nariño   -  55.08  -   18.78  12.35  45.89 
  Norte  de  Santander  63.39 36.29 66.06 33.60 39.82 58.74 
  Quindío  100    - 100.00   - 100.00   - 
  Risaralda  100    - 100.00   -  82.76  17.24 
  Santander  48.92 29.49 60.64 37.23 62.42 33.54 
 Sucre  3.49   -  -    -   -  100.00 
  Tolima  47.62 45.27 86.04 13.85 66.66 26.87 
 Valle del Cauca  77.15  5.58  85.42  2.45  81.95  18.05 
Total  44.93 36.88 59.62 35.44 45.18 43.14 
 
             (a) Neighboring refers to a maximum distance of 25 kilometres. 
Source: Boletín Trimestral de Estadística Nacional (1894), LeGrand (1988), Gaceta Oficial (1854, 1856, 1858–1861), Registro 
Oficial (1862–1864), Diario Oficial (1865–1893), authors’ calculations. 
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Per capita production of exportable products in 1892 
(in logs)  0.40 0.81 0.00 4.53 
Per capita exportable products in 1892 without plantain 
(in logs)  0.35 0.78 0.00 5.98 
Per capita coffee production in 1892 (in logs)  0.19  0.54  0.00  4.52 
Per capita coffee production in 1925 (in logs)  1.95  2.21  0.00  6.86 
Distance to town with colonial institutions   0.71  0.22  0.00  1.00 
Distance to town with disentailments of church lands  0.58  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Distance to town with public lands allotments  0.61  0.27  0.00  1.00 
Distance to town with dissolution of resguardos during 
the XVIII century  0.36 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Presence of land conflicts, 1827–1917  0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00 
Presence of land conflicts, 1827–1931  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00 
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Table 6. Econometric results. Dependent variables: exportable production in 1892, exportable 
production without plantain in 1892, coffee production in 1892 and coffee production in 1925. 
Methods  Instrumental Probit  (marginal effects)  Instrumental Tobit 
  
Production 
1892    

















1892   
















Panel A: Second stage 
-0.53*** -0.53***  -0.43***  -0.61***  -0.65*** -6.12**  -7.81**  -5.02** -7.36*  -8.10  Land conflict 1827–
1917  (0.47) (0.38)  (0.52)  (0.51)  (0.41)  (3.04) (3.46)  (2.51)  (4.31)  (5.27) 
0.01 -0.02  -0.05  -0.25**  -0.28***  -0.42 -0.58  -0.88**  -2.36***  -2.97*** 
Resguardos   (0.22) (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.53) (0.61)  (0.44)  (0.76)  (1.04) 
0.14* 0.18**  0.19**  0.06  0.01 0.99**  1.23** 1.06***  0.57  0.33 
Disentailments  (0.20) (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.48) (0.55)  (0.40)  (0.68)  (0.72) 
0.40*** 0.40***  0.39***  0.30***  0.29***  2.27***  3.11***  2.37***  2.39**  2.65* 
Public lands  (0.17) (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.85) (0.97)  (0.72)  (1.22)  (1.50) 
Panel B: First stage 
-0.19*** -0.19***  -0.19***  -0.19***  -0.17** -0.19***  -0.19***  -0.19***  -0.19*** -0.17** 
Colonial institutions  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
-0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10  -0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.11 
Resguardos   (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
0.10* 0.10*  0.10*  0.10*  0.06 0.10*  0.10*  0.10*  0.10* 0.06 
Disentailments  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
0.23*** 0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.25***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.25*** 
Public lands  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
p value sets 
p value for geographical 
variables set  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
p value for production 
variables set 1851  [0.65] [0.73]  [0.90]  [0.67]  [0.72]  [0.33] [0.60]  [0.85]  [0.04]  [0.03] 
Number of observations  733  733  733  733  733  733  733  733  733  733 
Wald Test 
chi2  =  
6.98 >  
0.0082 
chi2  =   9.13 >  
0.0025 
chi2  =  5.69 
> 0.0171 
 chi2 = 6.93 
> 0.0085 
chi2 =  
6.78 > 
0.0092 
chi2 = 4.23 > 
0.0398 
Chi2 = 5.26 > 
0.0218 
chi2 = 3.94  
> 0.0472 
chi2 = 3.07  
> 0.0798 
chi2 = 2.57  > 
0.1090 
Panel A: Reports the second stage of the estimation both of the probit and the tobit for the dummy of export production for 1892 and 
1925 and log of the export production per capita as dependent variables, respectively.   
Panel B: Reports the first stage for the two models with conflict (1827–1917) as a dependent variable.  The explanatory variables are the 
average distance from Encomienda for the year 1560 and from municipalities with more than 20 slaves in 1800; the other regressors 
used in panel 1 are included.    
Columns (5) and (10): These estimations were made taking the variable conflict 1827–1931 as the instrument, to approach the whole 
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Number of square kilometres of Public Land Allocated
Number of transactions of Public Lands allocated
 
Source: Gaceta Oficial (1854, 1856, 1858–1861), Registro Oficial (1862–1864), Diario Oficial (1865–1931), and authors’ calculations 
 






















Number of Public Lands Transactions Exportation Price Index
 
Source: Gaceta Oficial (1854, 1856, 1858–1861), Registro Oficial (1862–1864), Diario Oficial (1865–1893),  
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Map 1. Presence of coffee production in 1851, 1892 and 1925. 
                    
 
Source: Geografía Física y Política de la Confederación Granadina, volumes I, II, III, IV, V (2002),  Boletín 
Trimestral de Estadística (1894), Monsalve (1927). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 